Eurosceptical narrative revivified by the Eurozone crisis which has given rise to the unedifying notion that Britain is 'shackled to the corpse of Europe'. 12 As we shall see, broadsheet newspapers express Euroscepticism in a more restrained fashion, while television broadcasters tend to achieve greater balance still. The general trend, however, has been towards the predominance of coverage tainted by hard Eurosceptical editorialization.
The article proceeds in three parts. The opening section sets the scene by assessing the nature of the UK media's change of heart on European integration since EEC accession in between Thatcherite Euroscepticism and the representations of 'Europe' in the popular press, suggesting that 'the Murdoch effect' is inextricably intertwined with 'the Thatcher effect' on contemporary Britain. The central argument through the piece is that a study of the former rather than latter provides the more persuasive explanation for the size and especially the manner of the collapse in media support for the EU in Britain since membership was achieved. Contestation arising from an ever-widening and deepening EU has created many opportunities for attacking all things European and the media, led by tabloid alarmism, have played a crucial enabling role in encouraging the Eurosceptic cause by legitimating political criticism of the EU. Not least, however, the media have worked synergistically with politicians to articulate a workable language of Euroscepticism that has taken hold of the popular imagination.
From permissive consensus to destructive dissent
Observers at the time of the 1975 UK referendum on continued membership of the EEC, as well as those looking back with the benefit of hindsight, are inclined to agree that: 'During the campaign, virtually all the mainstream national British press supported the Yes campaign, with the Communist Morning Star being the only notable national daily to back the No campaign'. 13 Colin Seymour-Ure adds that Labour weeklies such as Tribune and the Transport and General Workers' Union monthly Record, with a regular circulation of 300,000, provided valuable leadership to the No side in the press. 14 More enduring still,
Ernest Wistrich contends that the Daily Express was also in the No camp, in line with its
Empire-first conception of Britain's world role and concomitant criticism of Britain's membership bids in the 1960s, 15 although it softened its opposition after the October 1971 parliamentary vote in favour of accession. 16 Roy Greenslade points out that support for membership in UK countries other than England was less than fulsome with Scottish titles such as the trade union-run Scottish Daily News backing the No campaign. 17 All in all, widespread press backing surely helped sway a British public which had been antipathetic to the EEC through the 1960s and early 1970s to the Yes side. 13 Mark Baimbridge, 'The Pre-history of the Referendum', in Mark Baimbridge, ed Partisan though some newspaper backing undoubtedly was, 18 it surely also reflected the success of the pro-EEC movement in the government and civil service which actively sought to persuade the media, initially to support EEC membership bids and then to buttress the case for continued membership once inside the EEC. To begin with, the Yes campaign was better backed financially than the No campaign, as well as being better organized and more ruthlessly persistent in making its case to individual journalists and broadcasters. 19 Moreover, by 1971 the Edward Heath government had mobilized supportive politicians and, as Paul Gliddon documents, top civil servants in the Foreign Office, who worked fervently behind the scenes to target key segments of the opinion-forming broadcast media in an information-come-propaganda campaign that added up to nothing less than 'a massive publicity drive on membership'. 20 Andy Mullen notes that between July and October 1971 alone, ministers made 280 speeches on the subject, 'flooded the press with letters', and set up a European Unit within the Information Research Department (IRD) to rebut the claims of the anti-European camp.
In a more cohesive broadcast market than exists today, and when broadcasters were seen to be the agenda setters rather than the press, the government was able to concentrate its efforts to convince broadcasters on top rated news and current affairs on the BBC and ITV:
'Radio and television were particularly targeted, including programmes such as News at Ten, Panorama, Today, 24 Hours, Women's Hour and World at One'. 21 In the interest of maintaining a veneer of balance, equal numbers of television and radio slots were set aside for broadcasts on behalf of the Britain in Europe (Yes) and the National Referendum Campaign (No) organizations in the last fortnight of the campaign. 22 By referendum day, BBC 'Impartiality' polling found just 3% of the audience thought there was 'a general BBC bias in favour of staying in. No one, it seemed, thought that the BBC was in favour of British withdrawal'. 23 As one prominent Conservative Eurosceptic has reflected, being given airtime to make the case against the EEC was difficult enough: 'What was worse was how [the media] distorted whatever we said on the few occasions they gave any space to our views or the facts we stated'. 24 The 1975 referendum debate is thus good territory on which to consider the positive messages about the EEC sent out by broadly the majority of parliamentarians and media agents.
Contemporary media coverage of the merits or otherwise of the EU in Britain exhibits a rather different set of tendencies. Now it is the pro-Europeans who feel marginalized or ignored: 'over the past twenty years, pro-Europeanism in this country has declined from being the intellectual mainstream of political discourse ... to a distinctly minority position, and not infrequently a persecuted one at that.' 25 In this interpretation the British are fed 'Fleet Street's blaring headlines about EU scandals and (specious) incursions such as its outlawing of square gin bottles and curved bananas'. 26 Cross-party pressure groups such as Britain in Europe have felt compelled to spend time and money rebutting the 'myths' that have grown up around the EU's regulation and red tape, sovereignty and bureaucracy. 27 Meanwhile, websites such as Fullfact.org investigate misinformation about EU rules and regulations in the British press as part of its inquiries into the truth or otherwise of statistical claims made 9 by politicians and journalists on a range of national public policy issues. 28 The EU also engages in image management and myth-exposure through its Press Watch publication, 29 however, the EU institutions themselves have been criticized for lacking professionalism in their dealings with journalists, especially those on the 'Brussels beat'. Even when UK Brussels-based journalists do cover EU affairs sympathetically the tone of the original copy can easily be altered since 'there is the capacity to give coverage a direct, Eurosceptic inflection where London editors think this is necessary'. 30 In this view the EU is constructed, were six British daily newspapers with permanent correspondents in Brussels; seven years later there were just three, and one of those is based partly in Paris. 31 Piecing all this together it can be argued that the EU's 'communication deficit' is part self-inflicted, part imposed upon it by the domestic focus of national media and increasingly a casualty of cutbacks in the age of austerity: 'lack of active communication, but also a lack of being communicated in the the British countryside, its history and heritage -'For all who love our green and pleasant land' as its website puts it. 37 As newspapers that were formerly supportive of UK membership of the EEC have rethought their opinions since accession, and in particular during major periods of constitutional debate such as over Maastricht and Lisbon, so newspapers such as the Express which, as we have seen, were always critical of the European project, have shifted with them to retain a distinctive voice within this highly competitive marketplace. This 'chase' to the Eurosceptical end of a notional 'federalist-Eurosceptical' spectrum of opinion culminated in the Express launching a 'Get Britain out of Europe' campaign in November 2010, part of its 'struggle to repatriate British sovereignty from a political project that has comprehensively failed' and to help the British 'win back their country'. The newspaper advocates withdrawal from both the EU and from the 'alien, pan-European tribunal' that is the European Court of Human Rights from which 'It is time to break free'. 38 As Peter Anderson observes, in presenting the EU as fundamentally dysfunctional with membership doing Britain more harm than good over the long-term, UK withdrawal has been on the covert agenda of newspapers such as the Express and Telegraph for some time. 39 The Eurozone crisis has injected a greater sense of urgency to the reporting and unleashed what have probably all along been the Express's 'true' feelings about the EU, as well as letting it be seen to lead the way in opposing the EU to attract readers who might find the hopes that Britain can reform the EU from the inside fundamentally flawed or rather passé given the depth of malaise in the European project.
Providing something of an antidote to the Eurosceptical comment and analysis on the press side are the Guardian, Independent and Financial Times, although the Eurozone crisis has clearly shaken the latter's relative faith in the long-term viability of European sovereignty-sharing. 40 Informed weeklies such as the Economist add a measure of balance to the overall picture, 41 but in terms of readership numbers and therefore influence over the terms of the debate they cannot compete with the top-selling daily newspapers. Away from the press, the nature and impact of editorialization in the broadcast media are harder to assess with clarity because there is less empirical research to draw upon when reaching a verdict. On one hand, Dykes and Donnelly suggest that apart from the Murdoch-owned Sky channels 'The BBC and ITV are on the whole neutral on European issues, although both suffer from being over-reactive to the daily agenda of the overwhelmingly anti-European press. They Englishwomen who must now be spinning in their graves as the country they loved, respected, fought for (and in so many cases died for) is torn apart and threatened with extinction'. 45 The BBC has taken to its editorial blogs to challenge these now long-running criticisms of its reporting on Europe by emphasizing how difficult it is, on a controversial topic such as Europe, 'for an impartial news organisation to report without inflaming strong views on either side of the debate'. 46 There is often more heat than light in the anti-BBC tirades and unvarnished critics aside, therefore, it is safer to agree with Gavin's reading of the mainstream UK coverage: 'few analysts of television coverage have criticized the BBC or ITV for editorializing' and, controversial issues such as the euro aside, the UK is not out of step with broadcasters from other nations when treated on a comparative basis. 47 This article privileges press over broadcast coverage for two reasons. First, press reporting in the UK reflects continent-wide trends in paying more frequent attention to European affairs than does broadcast journalism, 48 which tends to concentrate on the visually more appealing set-piece summitry and/or Europe-wide crises such as the Eurozone bailout negotiations. The second reason is that newspapers have increasingly performed the media agenda-setting function on European affairs in the UK, and where we are able most easily to track the shift from permissive consensus on Europe to destructive dissent. Put simply, the proportion of UK readers consuming Eurosceptic-inclined coverage of EU affairs now vastly 45 The blurred boundaries between patriotism and jingoism in the early 1980s help us appreciate how the framing of news stories can impact on the popular imagination, with research suggesting that 'When British press reporters caricature Europe and Europeans they marry the language of the stereotype to an underlying racist discourse of cultural difference, isolation and economic threat.' 82 It is noteworthy in this regard that foreigner-bashing had been a part and parcel of media coverage of international affairs in key segments of the UK media for several years before Thatcher's Bruges speech, which is often heralded as a turning point in alerting the British public to the perils of 'ever closer union' with Europe. Instead of being the catalyst her supporters might suggest, it did not take much in and around the 78 coverage of the Bruges speech to alert Thatcherites within and outside government to the idea that the European Community could be fitted into the threat narrative. 83 If anything it was the Maastricht ratification process that gave the Murdoch-Thatcher consensus on Europe the sustained period it needed to flourish and take a hold of the British Thatcher claimed that the reunified Germany was trying to achieve through European integration what it could not attain through wars because it was in their 'unreliable character' to act this way. 88 Not long afterwards the Secretary of State for Industry made these thoughts public, suggesting in The Spectator in July 1990 that the Community was 'a German racket'.
He went on to impute to European integration the unfolding of a German plot: 'I'm not against giving up some sovereignty in principle, but not to this lot. You might as well give it up to Adolf Hitler.' 89 Nicholas Ridley was sacked for this comment, but with politicians giving such cues to newspaper owners and editors occasionally in public but most likely off the record, it is no surprise that hard Euroscepticism has come to be associated with some of the most visceral and unappealing elements of the British national psyche. In April that year the Sun, which generally left Germanophobia to The Times, Telegraph, Mail and Express, 90 had fused mockery of Labour leader Neil Kinnock with anti-Germanism and Euroscepticism by commenting that while Thatcher was a 'champion' for combating the threat of a European superstate, Kinnock would be 'shaking the clenched fist of Euro-power ... warbling "Deutschland über Alles"'. 91 Now, the British political elites were not alone in being wary of a reunified Germany after the end of the Cold War. President François Mitterrand of France and the Netherlands' Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, both 'expressed their fears more or less forcefully' at the time. 92 However, that Thatcher and the Thatcherites should display such 'deep distrust of German motives', 93 and in such a manner, opened political but perhaps more importantly discursive space within which the history of Anglo-German enmity could be revisited in the context of ever more fraught debates over the future shape of the EU. For public consumption, of course, anti-German sentiment was subsumed into arguments about how best to 'contain Germany by a balance of power', 94 The turn to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s was a symptom of Britain's identity angst but it would soon become a casualty of it. Where it has been reported seriously at all, 'Europe' has routinely been depicted in the opinion-forming sections of the British print media as a necessary evil in the post-imperial world and as a poor second, at best, to the 'special relationship' with the US. As influential segments of the media became increasingly hostile and laced with nationalist bigotry, so politicians came to believe that the scope for serious and sustained public discussion of European affairs was dangerous to their personal careers and party political fortunes. From accusations of verbal 'deals' to direct threats to change policy, the Murdoch effect on European policy in the UK might not have been decisive in determining politicians' approaches to European integration, but was surely instrumental in engendering a climate of fear on European issues that must have featured in pro-European politicians' calculations about what was and was not possible in this vital realm of British foreign policy. Certainly the evidence from the Blair years is that fear of Murdoch inhibited any proactive moves on controversial European topics such as a referendum on joining the single currency or, later, the Lisbon Treaty. Further research might usefully branch out more than I have been able to here to study the sociological, ideological and commercial factors in the broader press drift from permissive consensus to destructive dissent through the 1980s and 1990s.
The second conclusion is that within a fifteen year period of joining, pro-Europeanism had gone from being the mainstream position within British politics to a sideshow. ProEuropeans were caught off guard and, as their sensitivity to the veiled threats emanating from the Murdoch empire grew, they became less and less willing to counter systematically the Eurosceptic challenge, either organizationally or in terms of providing a coherent alternative narrative to the Eurosceptic rendering of Britain's global position. Depending on one's point of view, pro-European politicians have either demonstrated a lack of leadership on European questions in Britain since accession, or they have played a cunning political game, calculating that on a relatively low salience issue such as Europe they can appease Murdoch at no great cost (and some likely benefit) to their electoral fortunes at general elections. In sum, the Murdoch effect on media coverage of the EU in Britain has been dramatic. It has altered the terms of the debate from 1973 to 2012 by convincing politicians from across the political spectrum that they should fear the EU and more importantly the backlash of the press should they try to publicize a more constructive position on European integration. Tabloid outrage against 'Europe' has become the stock national style of debating European affairs in Britain and this is unlikely to change in the near or even the distant future bar some radical changes in media ownership or ideology.
